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Science Communication
INTRODUCTION
Metaphors are pervasive in the language of science. 
Scientists regularly engage in analogical reasoning to develop 
hypotheses and interpret results, and they rely heavily on 
metaphors to communicate observations and findings (1). In 
turn, nonexperts make sense of, and contextualize, abstract 
ideas and new knowledge through the use of metaphors. 
While indispensable heuristic tools for doing, communicat-
ing, and understanding science, metaphors can also impede 
scientific inquiry, reinforce public misunderstandings, and 
perpetuate unintended social and political messages (2). For 
these reasons, it is especially important for scientists, science 
communicators, and science educators to acknowledge the 
conceptual, social, and political dimensions of metaphors in 
science and adopt critical perspectives on their use and effects. 
The role of metaphor in scientific thought and com-
munication has been widely considered by philosophers, 
rhetoricians, and science communication and public under-
standing of science scholars (2–7). Yet it seems that much 
of the preeminent work on metaphor in science is still 
unbeknownst to many scientists, who might benefit from 
the interdisciplinary insights this body of literature has to 
offer. This paper draws from several notable publications to 
highlight the importance of metaphors to scientific reasoning 
and science communication in the hope of sparking broader 
interest in, and concern for, the implications of metaphors 
in the life sciences. Following the tradition of critical studies 
of science (8–11), we open up the language of science to 
scrutiny and treat metaphors not just as heuristic and rhe-
torical devices, but also as social and political "messengers" 
(2) rooted in cultural dynamics and power relations.
The term metaphor can be traced to the Greek word 
metaphora, which is derived from meta (meaning “over”) 
and pherein (meaning “to carry”) (12). As I. A. Richards 
(13) explains, a metaphor is a comparison between two 
seemingly dissimilar concepts that involves the “carrying 
over of a word from its normal use to a new use” (p. 221). 
Metaphors are crucial in the production of knowledge in 
that they allow us to make concrete connections between 
abstract concepts and everyday experiences. A growing 
body of literature also suggests that metaphors shape the 
mind, structure our experiences, and influence behavior 
(14–17). Experimental studies reveal that changes in the 
framing of policy-relevant issues (such as crime, natural di-
sasters, and climate change) through metaphors can subtly, 
and covertly, influence the perception of risk, the sense of 
urgency, and the level of support for proposed “solutions” 
by acting on pre-existing cognitive schemas and prompting 
affective responses (15, 18–20). 
Lakoff and Johnson’s (14) theory of conceptual meta-
phor posits that the nature of human cognition is metaphori-
cal, and that all knowledge emerges as a result of embodied 
physical and social experiences. Under this view, metaphors 
are not mere linguistic embellishments. Rather, they are 
foundations for thought processes and conceptual under-
standings that function to map meaning from one knowledge 
and/or perceptual domain to another. When attempting to 
make sense of abstract, intangible phenomena, we draw 
from embodied experiences and look to concrete entities 
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to serve as cognitive representatives. For example, in the 
classic trope, “time is money,” our understanding of money, 
as well as meanings we ascribe to it, are mapped onto a tar-
get domain—time. The choice of money as a source domain 
here is influenced by perceived attribute similarities between 
it and the target domain concept (time). Subsequently, this 
linkage between money and time structures our experience 
with time, in that we conceptualize it as a form of currency 
that can be spent, invested, valued, and/or wasted (14). 
Embodied cognition perspectives shed light on the 
imperative of metaphor in scientific thought and communica-
tion. Conceptual frameworks and theoretical models in sci-
ence are rooted in the same embodied understandings of the 
world as those unconsciously employed in other day-to-day 
physical and social interactions (6). Scientific reasoning, then, 
is situated in what Gerhard Vollmer (21) refers to as the 
mesocosm, or the “section of the real world we cope with 
in perceiving and acting, sensually and motorically” (p. 89). 
Building on Vollmer’s work (as well as Lakoff and Johnson’s 
conceptual metaphor theory), Niebert and Gropengießer 
(17) argue that, because the human perceptual system is 
not well suited to interpreting macrocosmic (e.g., the bio-
sphere, solar systems, galaxies) and microcosmic (e.g., cells, 
molecules, atoms) phenomena, scientists regularly turn to 
metaphors, grounded in mesocosmic experiences, to make 
sense of observations and communicate ideas. They explain: 
Consider the following constructs where scientists make 
use of everyday experience to explain their theories. 
Robert Hooke was the first to denote the cell using the 
term “cell” when an image of a piece of cork under his 
microscope reminded him of the small rooms, or cells, 
occupied by monks in monasteries. Kepler developed 
his concept of planetary motion by comparison with a 
clock. Huygens used water waves to theorise that light 
is wavelike. Arrhenius described the greenhouse effect 
by referring to his experience with hot pots. In ever new 
variations, scientists employ experiences from everyday 
life to understand scientific phenomena. (17, p. 2)
Though the use of metaphorical language in science has 
been historically criticized by some philosophers of science 
and scientists on the grounds that metaphors are figurative, 
ambiguous, and imprecise, their generative potential can-
not be ignored. It is, in fact, metaphor that makes theory 
possible, and a great number of scientific revolutions have 
been initiated through novel comparisons between natural 
phenomena and everyday experiences (3).
Limitations of metaphors in science communication 
Metaphors in biology and ecology are so ubiquitous that 
we have to some extent become blind to their existence. 
We are inundated with metaphorical language, such as ge-
netic “blueprints,” ecological “footprints,” “invasive” species, 
“agents” of infectious disease, “superbugs,” “food chains,” 
“missing links,” and so on. While we may not be able to con-
ceptualize, or communicate, abstract scientific phenomena 
without employing such metaphors, we must also recognize 
their limitations, as well as their potential to constrain inter-
pretations of natural processes. In many ways, the metaphors 
we rely upon may uphold and reinforce outdated scientific 
paradigms, contributing to public misunderstandings about 
complex scientific issues. 
Take for example the concept of genes as “blueprints,” 
which has guided research in molecular biology for decades 
(for recent examples of blueprint metaphors in molecular 
biology publications, see 22–24). Critics argue that con-
ceptualizing the genome as a blueprint (or variations such 
as codes or instructions) is deterministic, oversimplifies 
complex gene-gene and gene-environment interactions 
(10, 25), and is, in many ways, incompatible with recent 
advancements in the fields of developmental biology and 
epigenetics (26). If genes really do function as blueprints, 
we should expect a one-to-one correspondence between 
particular genetic “instructions” and phenotypic outcomes 
in organisms, with limited input from the environment in 
structuring variation between individuals. Yet this is not 
the case. Often, single genes can, and do, direct multiple 
phenotypic outcomes through epigenetic processes that 
are responsive to the environment. This concept of vari-
able phenotypic responses to environmental conditions, or 
plasticity, has become an increasingly important framework 
for understanding not only how organisms develop, but 
also the role of genes in initiating evolutionary change. Our 
metaphors, however, have not kept up with recent advances 
in scientific understandings. Accordingly, this has led some 
biologists to reject the blueprint metaphor and offer up new 
ways of conceptualizing the nature of genes (26). 
Barbara Katz Rothman (25) suggests that envisioning 
genes as “recipes” is more accurate in that it allows for the 
incorporation of time, growth and development, and the im-
portance of the environment on the “final product.” She writes,
A recipe might make more sense as an analogy. Take 
bread baking, which combines making something with 
growth, the growth of the yeast that gives bread its 
rise. The same recipe under different circumstances 
gives you different breads. Use a flour from a wheat 
grown in one part of the country and you have a dif-
ferent mineral composition than that from flour grown 
somewhere else. Bake on a humid day and you get a 
heavier bread than you would on a dry day. Bake on 
a hot day and it rises faster and has bigger airholes. 
Bake the same recipe every day for a week, and no two 
loaves will be exactly the same: the web, that distinc-
tive pattern of holes, will vary from loaf to loaf. Bake it 
in different pans or in different ovens and you’ll have 
differently textured crusts. (25, p. 33) 
While the recipe metaphor is useful in that it provides 
new ways of envisioning gene-environment interactions, it 
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is not without problems. Some critics point out that it dif-
fers little from that of the blueprint metaphor, other than 
appealing to different personal experiences and triggering 
different gendered associations (27). Moreover, both recipes 
and blueprints are essentially a static “set of directions for 
producing a tangible material product” (28 p. 33) and may 
be equally constraining when it comes to conceptualizing 
what genes are and what they do. Survey, interview, and 
focus-group data collected by Condit et al. (27) indicate 
that genetic metaphors activate diverse, context-dependent 
meanings (as well as varying degrees of deterministic con-
notations) amongst different audiences, and they highlight 
the need for more empirically-grounded research in critical 
discussions of metaphor use in the life sciences. 
Metaphors as sociopolitical messengers
In the United States, many of the metaphors we use to 
talk about topics in biology and ecology are competitive and 
militaristic (e.g., evolutionary “arms-races,” cells being “hi-
jacked” by viruses), and/or technology driven (e.g., the brain 
as “computer,” body as “machine,” cells as “factories”). Our 
choice of words not only reflects deep cultural cosmologies 
and historical influences (2) but also reinforces cultural norms, 
ideologies, and beliefs. Though metaphors are indispensable 
tools for communicating science, they are sometimes mis-
leading to the general public and can be easily exploited in 
attempts to further social and political agendas (26). 
Since the 17th century, mechanical metaphors have 
been used extensively by scientists to make sense of na-
ture (26). Part of the appeal of the machine-based analo-
gies that emerged during the Scientific Revolution resided 
in their perceived compatibility with religious beliefs. As 
Pigliucci and Boundry explain, “the mechanical pictures of 
living organisms and the cosmos at large converged into 
an intellectual tradition where theology and science were 
intimately intertwined” (26, p. 455). Machine metaphors 
allowed for religious speculation and inferred an inescap-
able conclusion: that a designer or creator must exist (for 
all machines have a maker). Though the vast majority of 
working scientists today reject design as an explanation for 
scientific processes, they nonetheless still rely on mechanical 
metaphors to understand (and communicate) the natural 
world. As a result, science education is rife with machine-
based explanations and imagery that may inadvertently 
foster teleological thinking in students and the public. The 
intelligent design movement has exploited scientists’ use 
of machine metaphors and continues to employ machine 
analogies as powerful persuasive tools (26).
The “war on invasive species” is another example that 
demonstrates how certain sociopolitical ideologies become 
entangled with scientific discourse. Militaristic metaphors 
are abundant not just in popular articles on invasive species, 
but also in the scientific literature (2). Despite debates over 
what constitutes an invasive vs. a native species (as well as 
disagreements over whether or not species that spread 
rapidly are any more damaging than species with limited 
ranges), the language of invasion biology incites fear and 
encourages action. Invasion metaphors are performative 
in the sense that they encourage “weed pulls and control 
programs, the erection of barrier zones, lucrative contracts 
for herbicide companies, and research grants for invasion 
biologists” (2, p. 175). Such metaphors also blur “facts” with 
“values,” reflecting—and reinforcing—nationalistic concerns 
regarding invasion and immigration, xenophobia, and com-
mitment to militaristic responses (2, 29).
Popular metaphors in biology and ecology are also 
windows into a culture of science that is deeply rooted in 
hegemonic norms and values that are perpetuated through 
both the process of scientific inquiry and science commu-
nication (30, 31). When metaphor choices are not appro-
priately vetted with careful social, political, and historical 
considerations in mind, they may subtly contribute to the 
alienation of individuals and groups. Joan Herbers’ criticism 
of entomologists’ use of slavery metaphors (31) to describe 
the behavior of ants illuminates this issue. Herbers explains 
that, though unintentional, the use of such “racially loaded” 
(p. 104) metaphors in contemporary scientific discourse 
functions to naturalize human social institutions and unequal 
social relations, and is potentially offensive to the many de-
scendants of slaves living in the United States and other parts 
of the world today (31). Descriptions of “slave-making” ants 
originated during the height of the slave trade of the 1800s 
and, despite being a misleading and inaccurate description 
of actual ant behavior, continue to be used in popular pub-
lications and journal articles (a recent library search by the 
authors using ex libris primo identified 44 scholarly articles 
published between 2012 and 2017 that made reference to 
slave-making ants). Equally as problematic is the persistent 
use of other anthropomorphic analogies (harems, castes, 
colonies, etc.) in the life sciences to describe non-human 
social relations. Such analogies inadvertently legitimize 
systems of dominance and hierarchy, reproduce racial and 
gendered stereotypes, and may perpetuate dehumanizing co-
lonial representations of historically subjugated groups (32). 
Remnants of colonialism also echo within scientific 
discourses through the use of metaphors that equate the 
practice of science itself with penetrating the unknown, 
conquering nature, and pioneering new frontiers (30, 33). 
Many science-related metaphors harbor traditionally mas-
culine values and may activate implicit associations between 
science, gender, and/or race, thus reinforcing dominant 
stereotypes about who does science. This is especially wor-
risome given that recent studies involving primary, second-
ary, and undergraduate students indicate that stereotypes 
of scientists as “white” and “male” continue to persist and 
negatively impact the science aspirations of students from 
underrepresented groups (34–36). 
In light of these observations, some scholars have at-
tempted to generate new metaphors that are more inclu-
sive and less alienating to individuals whose identities and 
experiences do not align with perceptions of the culture 
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of science. Flannery (30), for example, offers “quilting” as 
an alternative metaphor for scientific research that directs 
attention to similarities in the skills and processes employed 
by both scientists and artisans (creativity, collaboration, pains-
taking attention to detail, the cultivation of tacit knowledge, 
etc.). She argues that if the metaphors we used to talk about 
science acknowledged the communal, craft-like aspects of 
scientific endeavors, we might imagine the process of science 
in productive new ways that are less alienating to traditionally 
marginalized groups. Like all metaphors, however, Flannery’s 
is not without problems and limitations. Some readers will 
undoubtedly object to this metaphor on the grounds that it 
is exclusionary in its own right (to individuals and groups who 
are unfamiliar with, and/or uninterested in, quilt-making tradi-
tions), and that it obscures the important fact that the final 
outcomes of scientific research are unknown (as opposed to 
the predetermined products of quilting). Nevertheless, Flan-
nery’s considerations provide opportunities to envision how 
novel metaphors might emphasize different ways of doing sci-
ence and broaden (or narrow) its appeal to underrepresented 
groups. Much more research is still needed in examining the 
role of science-related metaphors in activating stereotypical 
representations of how science is done, and by whom. 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
For all of their problems, metaphors are indispensable 
tools for both practicing and communicating science. No 
metaphor is perfect, and incongruities between target and 
source meanings are unavoidable. Some metaphors, how-
ever, may be more (or less) constraining when it comes to 
conceptualizing complex scientific issues. Careful consid-
eration must be paid not only to the ways in which meta-
phors may contribute to public misunderstanding, but also 
to how their use may unintentionally reinforce particular 
social and political messages that undermine the goals of 
inclusive science. More interdisciplinary collaborations be-
tween scholars in the life sciences, social sciences, and the 
humanities might be helpful in cultivating new metaphors 
that better align with contemporary values and goals of the 
scientific community at large and are more salient, more 
familiar, and less offensive to underrepresented groups. Ad-
ditionally, more attention could be paid to helping students 
develop the skills and competencies needed for identifying 
metaphors, assessing their strengths and limitations in con-
ceptualizing abstract ideas, and unpacking their more subtle 
social and political messages. We suspect that educational 
activities involving the dissection of metaphors in the sci-
ence classroom might help move students toward deeper 
understandings of scientific concepts and help foster greater 
concern for, and commitment to, civic responsibilities among 
future scientists.
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